Discussão Thaler e Rizzo sobre Comportamento Humano

O Wall Street Journal promoveu uma discussão entre Thaler e Rizzo sobre o comportamento humano. A seguir a reprodução da discussão:

Should Policies Nudge People
To Make Certain Choices?

Driven by research in behavioral economics that suggests people don't always act in their own best interests, some economists are arguing for new policies that would challenge traditional "hard" tools for changing behavior, such as sin taxes and outright bans.

Such policies would often rely on default options that nudge, steer and coax -- but don't force -- individuals to make certain choices. Is this sensible governance? The Online Journal asked Mario Rizzo, a professor of economics at New York University and director of NYU's Program on the Foundations of the Market Economy, and Richard Thaler, professor of economics and behavioral science at the University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business, to hash it out.

What do you think? Share your comments on our discussion board.

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Richard Thaler writes: Behavioral economics is founded on the unremarkable observation that human beings are imperfect decision makers. They have limited information-processing abilities, willpower, memory and attention. As a result, they make predictable errors by their own lights. Many Americans think of themselves as overweight; most 401(k) participants think they are saving too little; and nearly everyone thinks of himself as forgetful.

In light of human limitations, Cass Sunstein and I argue for policies that we call libertarian paternalism. Although the phrase sounds like an oxymoron, we contend that it is often possible to design policies, in both the public and private sector, that make people better off -- as judged by themselves -- without coercion. We oppose bans; instead, we favor nudges.

Consider two examples, both designed to increase savings. The first is to enroll people, automatically, into savings plans -- while allowing them to opt out. The second is the Save More Tomorrow plan, which allows employees to commit themselves now to increasing their savings rates later, when they get raises. Both approaches have been remarkably successful.

Well-chosen default rules are examples of helpful "choice architecture." Since it is often impossible for private and public institutions to avoid picking some option as the default, why not pick one that is helpful?

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Mario Rizzo writes: The decisions of individuals may be imperfect but can the legal paternalist successfully steer them toward better decisions?

I say legal paternalist because Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler clearly do not object to using coercion at the level of framing decisions. For example, they seem to approve of employers' being legally required to provide automatic 401(k) enrollment unless the employee opts out. But they also approve of mandatory cooling-off periods for consumer purchases; these cooling-off periods absolutely prevent individuals from concluding immediate exchanges even at lower prices.

It is a good thing to help people make better decisions. But law requires us to go beyond intention. What is the appropriate standard for better decisions? Thaler and Sunstein say it's what people would do if they had "complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of willpower." This is a very ambitious standard that could tax the abilities of even well-meaning policymakers.

Can we discover "true" preferences through individuals' statements that they are too fat and save too little? Talk is cheap. These could be expressions of mere desire, not a real willingness to make trade-offs between values. We all want to have more savings and more consumption, too.

Moreover, the public sector is not governed by science or even by behavioral economists, but by ambitious people with limited cognitive abilities, lack of willpower, and faulty memories, not to mention expanding waistlines. Whom should we trust more: individuals who face the costs and benefits of their own choices, or politicians and bureaucrats who do not?

Richard Thaler writes: It is both wrong and misleading to characterize libertarian paternalism as primarily an activity of governments. Automatic enrollment and Save More Tomorrow have been adopted in thousands of companies with no governmental involvement. When the government does get involved, we prefer nudges to requirements. A good example is the 2006 Pension Protection Act. Under that law, firms that offer to at least partially match their employees' contributions, enroll their employees automatically, and automatically escalate their contribution rates are given a waiver from some burdensome paperwork. No coercion is involved.

We agree that it can be difficult to determine people's true preferences. And it is an axiom of behavioral economics that intentions do not always -- or even usually -- lead to action. But statements of good intention can signal a desire for help in following through. Many employees have voluntarily signed up for the Save More Tomorrow program, and very few subsequently quit. We do not think that many people would sign up for "Smoke More Tomorrow," or "Eat More French Fries Tomorrow."

We agree that government workers are human. We are also happy to go on the record stipulating that politicians are boundedly rational. Some are also dishonest. Some are even fat. However, what are the implications of these obvious facts? Do we want to charge our political leaders with the task of making people worse off?

Often nudges are inevitable. Where they aren't, we agree that unless there is a good showing of need, government might do best to stand aside.

* * *


Mario Rizzo writes: Is New Paternalism primarily about advising private individuals and firms? If so, why use a political term -- libertarian -- to identify it?

It's true, some firms have adopted automatic 401(k) enrollment policies -- while fewer have adopted the Save More Tomorrow program. The market allows for this diversity while eliminating ineffective or inappropriate plans. No libertarian I know of has ever opposed privately adopted options. If this is all Thaler is saying, what's new?

But Thaler and Sunstein do go beyond this. Elsewhere, they've argued for costly contractual provisions like vacation time, allowing only termination for cause, non-waivable cooling-off periods, maximum 40-hour work weeks, and -- presumably -- the legal requirement of automatic savings plan enrollment, if not enough firms voluntarily adopt it. All this is said to be consistent with "libertarian paternalism."

Thaler says that those automatically enrolled in 401(k)s haven't quit, so they must be benefiting. This is an odd claim for a behavioral economist. Why would failure to change indicate a benefit? When the default is non-enrollment, Thaler says that individuals tend to stay in it because they're irrationally biased toward keeping the status quo.

The mistakes of bureaucrats, politicians and voters aren't as likely to be corrected by individual or social processes as errors made in the private sphere. Why? Because bureaucrats and politicians don't care about private welfare as much as individuals do and voters don't have much incentive to become informed. So people -- who make imperfect decisions -- tend to do less harm if they "nudge" only themselves and not others through policy choices.

* * *


Richard Thaler writes: I am glad Mario agrees with our private initiatives on retirement savings in which firms have nudged rather than required employees to take certain beneficial actions. Surveys of employers suggest that a majority will be offering automatic features by next year, a big step forward. Of course, the fact that few employees opt out is partly due to inertia, but most employees do get around to joining the plan under opt in, so the main gain from automatic enrollment is to get people to join sooner, something they appreciate.

Mario's major complaints are with positions that we do not advocate, namely what he calls the "legal imposition of costly contractual presumptions." We have never suggested that any particular contractual form be imposed, including automatic enrollment. See my previous post. Instead we stress that when governments do write laws, especially those mandating -- rather than nudging -- some action, they should do so with an eye toward making people better off. We do admit to liking some mandated -- and thus non-libertarian -- cooling-off periods under certain circumstances, as when buyers are especially likely to have made decisions under undue selling pressure. Who amongst us has not bought something under pressure that he would like to undo the next morning?

Mario's main misconception is that government can avoid nudging. It can't. The rules of the common law are legal rules that governments write. Whether governments are more or less corrupt than the private sector is an empirical question, and there are surely many examples of dumb or unethical behavior in both sectors. But this is beside the point. We favor better government, not more government. We urge both sectors to adopt libertarian paternalistic policies.

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Mario Rizzo writes: I repeat: "Is New Paternalism primarily about advising private individuals and firms? If so, why use a political term -- libertarian -- to identify it?" It is simply a management-consulting philosophy.

If a firm chooses a default option, it is by no means inevitable that it must choose on the basis of paternalistic criteria. Under purely voluntary conditions, it will choose so as to enhance the attractiveness of its compensation package, that is, according to the actual preferences of its employees. Its goal is to maximize profits. To anticipate what employees or consumers want is the market principle, not paternalism. I repeat: "If this is all Thaler is saying, what's new?"

If automatic enrollment proves popular in the long run, then, at least most people must be aware of their procrastination bias -- assuming it exists -- and want to overcome it. The previously hostile legal environment had prevented employers from responding to this de-biasing preference.

As to the more intrusive examples of paternalism mentioned in my previous post, Richard and Cass Sunstein have indeed argued that they are consistent with libertarian paternalism. Let the reader decide.

The standard Richard advances that "when governments do write laws, especially those mandating -- rather than nudging -- some action, they should do so with an eye toward making people better off" may seem innocuous, but it is actually dangerous. This is because just about anything can slip by. (Satisfaction of informed preferences is an obscure criterion of "better off.") Such a standard could set in motion a slippery slope to much more intrusive interventions, especially in a world of boundedly rational individuals who tend to view the world in a narrow frame. It does not take corrupt public officials to go down this road. Self-interest and bounded rationality are quite enough.

* * *


Richard Thaler writes: Let's recapitulate. People make mistakes, so sometimes they can be helped. It is possible to help without coercion. That is libertarian paternalism. The concept can be and is used in both the public and private sectors. For example, in London, pedestrians from abroad are reminded by signs on the pavement to "look right" because their instincts from back home are to expect traffic to approach from the left. No one is forced to look right, but fewer pedestrians are hit by trucks.

Another example comes from Sweden, which launched a partial privatization of their social security system in 2000. The plan was open to any fund, which meant that participants faced 456 options. There was also a very well-designed default fund -- using private managers selected by the government -- that offered global diversification at very low fees (16 basis points). By any standard, both ex ante and ex post, the participants who selected their own portfolio of funds did worse than those who took the default plan. The main mistake the government made in designing this plan was to discourage participants from choosing the default fund, perhaps thinking, as Mario does, that choosing for oneself is always the best approach.

Mario thinks we are naïve about government. We think he is naïve about firms. Does he think that the companies that offered stock options to student loan officers to induce them to feature their loans had the "actual preferences" of the students at heart? Maximizing profits does not always mean maximizing the welfare of the customers.

Finally Mario seems to have a phobia about slippery slopes. I guess he thinks that if governments start with signs that say "look right," the next thing you know we will have Prohibition coming back. By the same logic, we should worry that if libertarians succeed in eliminating rent control that we will be soon down the slippery slope toward anarchy. Slippery slope arguments should be avoided unless there is proof that the slope is greased. In our case, by insisting, as we do, on only libertarian paternalism, the slope runs into a brick wall before it even gets started. And besides, what is the alternative? Inept neglect?

* * *


Mario Rizzo writes: Libertarianism is a political philosophy that seeks to reduce the activities of the state to a very low level. It is very much about less government. Paternalism is a political or moral philosophy that seeks to override the actual or operative preferences of individuals for their own benefit, however defined, according to Donald VanDeVeer's 1986 book on the subject. When applied to the actions of government, paternalism cannot be libertarian. It can only be more or less intrusive.

Does Richard wish to reduce his "libertarian paternalism" to the appropriate management of government-owned streets or other enterprises? In the London case, what people want is obvious: They don't want to get hit by cars. London is doing what entrepreneurs generally do: satisfying actual preferences. London is mimicking the market.

In Sweden, the government actively discouraged people from relying on the default investment option. People probably interpreted this as meaning the default option was not very good. They succumbed to this unfortunate inference because they viewed the government as an authoritative investment adviser. Government provision of investment advice is not consistent with libertarianism. But if it does provide advice, is it paternalistic to provide it in such a way that people make reasonable inferences? If Vanguard provides good advice, is that paternalism? In each case, this is just satisfying actual preferences for advice. (Note that none of this requires reference to the idea of "true" or "informed" preferences about which so big a deal was made.)

Richard wants to use the word "libertarian" to differentiate his paternalism from the traditional variants. Yet he uses the word in a fuzzy way. He wants to define libertarian along a continuous variable -- the cost of exercising the exit option. However, libertarianism, as every libertarian understands it, uses a bright-line test -- who imposes the cost? The authors of the concept of "libertarian paternalism" have said that clearly intrusive/coercive interventions are consistent with it. See my previous post. And they have also said, explicitly, that there is no sharp line between libertarian and non-libertarian paternalism. Thus, Richard cannot claim that his standard creates a bright-line rule that would help us resist the slippery slope.

Emoções e decisões morais

Um artigo de Fernando Reinach, que escreve semanalmente no Estadão, sobre finanças comportamentais.

Emoções e decisões morais Artigo
O Estado de São Paulo, p.a21

Fernando Reinach

A relação entre a moral e as emoções é parte subjacente da trama de grande parte dos romances, filmes e novelas.

Nossas decisões morais são influenciadas por nossas emoções ou seriam as emoções efeitos de nossos conflitos morais? Até recentemente esse tipo de problema pertencia ao campo da filosofia e da psicologia, mas agora neurocientistas estão abordando essas questões experimentalmente.

Imagine que você se defronte com o seguinte problema: um pequeno vagão vem descendo sem controle por um trilho que desemboca em uma bifurcação. Cabe a você operar um comando que determina se o vagão vai para a direita ou para a esquerda. Se você desviá-lo para a esquerda ele vai atropelar e matar cinco pessoas. Se você desviá-lo para a direita ele vai matar uma única pessoa.

Diante desse dilema moral, a grande maioria das pessoas escolhe a solução do mal menor: desvia o vagão para a direita sacrificando um para salvar cinco. Imagine agora que o vagão vem descendo a ladeira em direção às cinco pessoas, mas, antes, vai passar por baixo de uma ponte. Você está em cima da ponte e tem de tomar uma decisão. Ou não faz nada e deixa as cinco pessoas morrerem ou agarra uma pessoa que está em cima da ponte e a lança sobre os trilhos para parar o vagão.

Apesar de o número de pessoas mortas ser idêntico em cada opção (cinco mortes ao invés de uma), a grande maioria das pessoas prefere deixar as cinco pessoas morrerem a tomar a atitude de fisicamente jogar uma pessoa inocente nos trilhos e causar sua morte.

Recentemente, esse e outros experimentos do mesmo tipo foram repetidos com pacientes com uma lesão no córtex pré-frontal. Seis pacientes foram escolhidos pelo fato de terem lesões causadas por tumores ou por derrames em uma região específica do cérebro que, se destruída, reduz a capacidade da pessoa de sentir emoções como empatia, culpa ou vergonha.

Apesar de não sentirem essas emoções, os pacientes tinham capacidade de raciocínio e inteligência normais. O que foi observado é que os pacientes com a lesão tomavam as mesmas decisões que as pessoas normais quando as escolhas morais não envolviam aspectos sentimentais muito próximos ao indivíduo. Assim, nos exemplos acima, esses pacientes reagiram da mesma maneira que pessoas normais no caso do desvio do vagão.

Ao contrário das pessoas normais, mesmo quando a decisão envolvia pessoas próximas, os pacientes com a lesão tendiam a escolher a opção lógica. No exemplo da ponte, não hesitavam em atirar uma pessoa da ponte para salvar outras cinco. A conclusão desse estudo é que nossas decisões morais são intrinsecamente dependentes de fatores emocionais, mas que essa influencia só altera o julgamento quando a decisão moral envolve pessoas ou situações muito próximas ao sujeito.

Esse resultado não é inesperado, afinal a própria Justiça reconhece que o julgamento moral das pessoas pode ser bloqueado quando a decisão envolve pessoas ou situações muito próximas a cada um de nós. O interessante é que, pela primeira vez, se obtém comprovação experimental para essa observação, inclusive com o mapeamento das regiões do cérebro envolvidas nos fenômenos. Aos poucos a biologia vai explicando fenômenos mentais que antes pareciam exclusividade da filosofia.

Mais informações em Damages to the prefrontal córtex increases utilitarian moral judgements, na Nature, volume 446, página 908, 2007.

Sorte no mercado chinês

Uma reportagem do Wall Street Journal, 28/05/2007, mostra como a questão da superstição afeta o investimento no mercado acionário chinês:

Nas bolsas chinesas, a chave está no '8'
James T. Areddy, The Wall Street Journal
The Wall Street Journal Americas

XANGAI — Quando um amigo lhe deu várias dicas de investimentos acionários no ano passado, Yan Caigen comprou 30.000 ações de uma delas, uma fabricante de cimento. O motivo: o código da empresa, 600881, continha dois auspiciosos oitos.

"Eu acredito que bons códigos dão boa sorte", diz Yan, que passa quase todos os seus dias diante do monitor na corretora Shenyin & Wanguo Securities Co., de Xangai. De fato, a ação da Jilin Yatai Group Co., a fabricante de cimento em que ele apostou, rapidamente triplicou, gerando um lucro de US$ 50.000. Yan atribui o desempenho aos dois "8" no código numérico da ação, que ele considera uma combinação que dá sorte.

Parte superstição, parte profecia auto-realizável, a numerologia é uma estratégia básica da negociação de ações na China. Ela mostra como é amplamente disseminada na sociedade chinesa a crença de que os números contêm pistas para a boa sorte.

É uma crença pouco notada e que vem alimentando a alta das bolsas da quarta maior economia do mundo, cuja influência sobre outros mercados acionários tem crescido, como ficou evidente em fevereiro, quando uma forte queda em Xangai derrubou bolsas ao redor do planeta, de Frankfurt a São Paulo. O Índice Composto de Xangai subiu mais de 56% neste ano e já quadruplicou seu nível de meados de 2005, uma alta que vem gerando temores de uma bolha no mercado.

O fervor dos investidores com a numerologia também ajuda a explicar por que o governo chinês não tem conseguido esfriar o entusiasmo nas bolsas através de medidas convencionais, como a restrição ao crédito na semana passada.

Para observadores do mercado, a confiança dos investidores chineses no poder profético dos números — em vez de fundamentos econômicos, como perspectivas de negócios ou lucro — é um dos muito sinais de que o investimento nas bolsas de Xangai ou de Shenzhen parece uma jogatina.

As corretoras são organizadas como se fossem cassinos. Os investidores tomam chá, fumam e conversam enquanto negociam em máquinas parecidas com caça-níqueis. Em vez de colocar moedas, eles passam o cartão para pagar pelas ações.

"Somos investidores individuais. Geralmente escolhemos às cegas qual ação vamos comprar", diz Chen Guoan, investidor de Xangai. Alguns distribuem cigarros para congratular os amigos quando a ação sobe.

Pessoas comuns, que geralmente entendem pouco ou nada de finanças, representam de 60% a 80% dos investidores na China. Nos Estados Unidos, por exemplo, o mercado é dominado por gigantes financeiros como Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co. e Fidelity Investments Inc. "Vêem-se coisas estranhas com as ações, com números e códigos da sorte", diz Jing Ulrich, presidente de investimentos na China do J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. "Isso reflete um mercado muito imaturo."

A maioria da classe média urbana da China não tem dinheiro nos quase 100 milhões de contas de corretagem do país. Novos investidores em número recorde, geralmente com pouco conhecimento sobre a mecânica do mercado, também estão entrando de cabeça nas bolsas, abrindo em média mais de 100.000 novas contas por dia neste ano. O governo já alertou para o perigoso nível de especulação, já que os investidores estão financiando suas compras de ações com empréstimos ou cartões de crédito. Nas últimas semanas, o valor diário do volume de transações chegou a quase US$ 50 bilhões.

A falta de uma imprensa livre na China e as restrições que as autoridades impõem ao que os analistas podem dizer publicamente deixam os investidores vulneráveis a teorias de negociação inusitadas. Eles em geral se valem de conselhos como o de usar roupas vermelhas, que representam um mercado "aquecido", e a evitar referências ao "pai", já que a palavra em chinês é homônima para "queda".

— Tang Hanting e Ellen Zhu colaboraram neste artigo.

Regras e Comportamento

As pessoas reagem as regras. Esta é uma verdade que tem sido comprovada diariamente. Um estudo interessante mostra uma aplicação disto nas corridas da Nascar. Este tipo de corrida inspirou a Stock Cars brasileira.

Desde 2003 a Nascar criou duas etapas. Numa primeira etapa, os corredores da Nascar tentam classificar para a etapa final, onde somente os dez primeiros colocados participam. A etapa final possui dez corridas. Isto mudou os incentivos dos corredores.

Se um corredor está fora dos dez primeiros, ele irá arriscar mais sua corrida para tentar obter uma boa classificação. Isto, naturalmente, pode resultar em acidentes ou em carros que não terminam a corrida.

O estudo citado acima mostra que a probabilidade de um acidente aumentou com a mudança de regras. Usando uma regressão linear, com variável binária (ou dummy), o autor do blog encontrou resultados expressivos.

Taxa de Juros e Comportamento

Uma notícia da Bloomberg (via blog de Mankiw) informa que o Banco Chines aumentou suas taxas em 0,18 e 0,27 pontos percentuais. Qual a razão deste aumento e não 0,25, usado por outros bancos?

A resposta está no calendário chinês e nas antigas crenças chinesas. Fan Wenzhong, autoridade bancária chinesa, afirma que na China as taxas de juros são sempre múltiplos de nove.

Como o ano financeiro chinês possui 360 dias, é mais fácil calcular números divididos por nove. Esta regra ocorre desde 1993. Além disto, o número nove está vinculado a longevidade, e é considerado um número de sorte.

Quem sabe do Banco Central do Brasil poderia colocar a SELIC a 9%? Ou a 9,99%?

Linha do tempo em Finanças Comportamentais

A linha do tempo de Finanças Comportamentais, usando o Google Timeline, é interessante. O ápice ocorre no final da década de 1990 (1999). Será que o interesse em Finanças Comportamentais diminuiu?

Clique aqui e veja

Comportamento e Aposentadoria

Este é um dos temas mais fascinantes de finanças comportamentais: como os indivíduos mudam sua reação conforme ficam mais velhos?

Um estudo mostrou que o comportamento das pessoas muda antes e depois da aposentadoria. O estudo foi realizado por uma instituição financeira, Prudential Financial, o que demonstra o interesse do mercado pelo assunto.

A pesquisa concluiu que as pessoas são afetadas pelo comportamento e que um parcela dos indíviduos acredita nisto. O texto encontra-se abaixo

New Study Explores Impact of Emotions on Retirement Investors
Business Wire - 17/05/2007

NEWARK, N.J. - (BUSINESS WIRE) - Five dominant emotions can influence retirement investors to react to market uncertainty in ways that may not be in their best interest, a new study released today by Prudential Financial, Inc. (NYSE:PRU) has found.

The "Behavioral Risk in The Retirement Red Zone(R)" research report explores the link between emotions and financial decision-making in investors approaching or in The Retirement Red Zone, the critical investment window five years before and after retirement. The report found that although three of four investors--76%--are affected by their emotions to a moderate or high degree, only one third (35%) believe emotions impact their investment decisions.

"The role emotions play in investment and retirement decisions is being recognized as an important factor in creating a successful retirement," according to David Odenath, president of Prudential Annuities. "For Americans in the Retirement Red Zone, understanding the emotions that can influence their behavior can ultimately help mitigate the effects of behavioral risk."

Focus groups conducted in conjunction with the research indicated that many Retirement Red Zone investors would prefer to rely on their financial professional to better understand the role emotions play in their financial decision-making. Armed with this information, Prudential partnered with experts in the field of behavioral finance at the University of Connecticut to develop a tool to determine an investor's Retirement Emotion Quotient(SM) (EQ). Working with their financial professional, investors can use this tool to determine their unique EQ score and identify which emotions may affect their investment decisions.

The research also identified five dominant emotions and tendencies that can affect Retirement Red Zone investors confronted with investment decisions: fear, regret, inertia, aggressiveness and susceptibility.

Key findings of the study included:

-- Behavioral risk affects nearly all investors to some degree.

Three of four (76%) rate moderate or high on their Retirement EQ score.

-- No single group is free from the influence of behavioral risk.

Seventy-two percent (72%) of men and 80% of women have moderate or high EQ scores, however only one-third of Retirement Red Zone investors (35%) feel emotions have an impact on their decisions.

-- The effects of behavioral risk are witnessed through five distinct emotions or tendencies.

Of the most prominent emotions--fear, regret, inertia, susceptibility and aggressiveness--80% register high or moderate degrees of regret, and 71% high or moderate degrees of fear, which can influence financial decisions.

-- Behavioral risk can influence investors to react in ways that may not be in their best interest.

For example, 86% of those registering a high degree of susceptibility (those influenced by the advice of friends or relatives) would take some or all money out of the market if confronted with significant market losses. Similarly, 78% of those scoring high on fear would do the same.

-- When confronted with the possibility of significant losses in The Retirement Red Zone, investors question their confidence in their retirement planning.

Eighty-nine percent (89%) of pre-retirees and 80% of retired investors wish they had incorporated better downside protection of their retirement assets.

-- Products that provide both accumulation and income guarantees help mitigate the effects of behavioral risk.

Three in four (75%) investors would consider an investment product that could provide various guarantees. With the benefit of these guarantees, most (85%) would be likely to weather out short-term losses.

"One clear outcome of the study: investors want to learn more about products that offer guarantees, and would seriously consider those products that offer protection against downside losses, participation in market gains and lifetime income," according to Odenath. To download a copy of the report, visit www.retirementredzone.com [http://www.retirementredzone.com].

Optional income guarantees and other annuity riders have limitations and come at an additional cost through the purchase of a variable annuity contract. Annuities are issued by The Prudential Insurance Company of America, Newark, N.J., or its affiliates. Securities products and services distributed by Prudential Investment Management Services LLC (member SIPC), Three Gateway Center, 14th Floor, Newark, NJ 07102-4077. All are Prudential Financial companies. Each is solely responsible for its own financial condition and contractual obligations. Guarantees are dependent on the claims-paying ability of the issuing company.

Investors should consider the contract and underlying portfolios' investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses carefully before investing. This and other important information are contained in the prospectuses, which can be obtained from your financial professional. You should read the prospectuses carefully before investing.

Aversão a perda

Um artigo no sítio Blue Bus sobre aversão a perdas:

O medo de perder é bem maior que a vontade de ganhar

Qual a importância de emoçoes como medo e desejo nas nossas decisoes cotidianas? Segundo alguns estudiosos do comportamento humano, essa influência pode ser bem decisiva para as escolhas que fazemos. Quer uma prova? Pesquisadores das universidades americanas de Stanford, Carnegie Mellon e Iowa colocaram 41 pessoas em volta da mesa, para um jogo de cara-ou-coroa em 20 rodadas e deram a cada uma U$ 20. Se os jogadores ganhassem, aumentariam o patrimônio em U$ 2,50. Se perdessem, deixavam na mesa U$ 1. Eles podiam também decidir nao participar da rodada.

Considerando as chances de 50% e o alto retorno pelo investimento, seria lógico que todos topassem o desafio na maioria das rodadas, certo? Mas nao foi isso o que aconteceu - os jogadores investiram apenas em 58% das rodadas. O mais interessante é que os pesquisadores incluíram no grupo 15 pessoas que haviam sofrido danos no cérebro, tendo sua capacidade de sentir emoçoes anulada. Estes, ao contrário dos demais, assumiram o risco em 84% das vezes. O resultado final? Os medrosos saíram do jogo em média com U$ 22,80 e os insensíveis com U$ 25,70. Curiosamente, todos começaram o jogo arriscando. Mas a partir das 1as experiências de perda, os participantes capazes de sentir emoçoes começaram a frear os investimentos, movidos pelo medo de perder posiçoes e regredir.

Apesar da ausência de emoçoes ter ajudado nessa experiência específica, os cientistas garantem que essa deficiência acarreta, em geral, muito mais dissabores do que vantagens. O ideal seria controlar as emoçoes para evitar que elas nos prejudiquem no mundo real, onde muitos de nós evitamos conflitos, adiamos trocas de emprego, desistimos de defesas mais veementes de nossas posiçoes e nunca adotamos novas estratégias, simplesmente porque o medo de perder é bem maior do que a vontade de ganhar.

Se você se reconheceu em alguns desses exemplos, pode se consolar pelo menos com a informaçao de que isso é natural nos seres humanos. Pelo menos naqueles habilitados a sentir emoçoes. (Luiz Alberto Marinho)

Sunk Cost como barreira de entrada

O Sunk Cost (custo perdido) é uma barreira para que novos concorrentes entrem num mercado? Esta questão tem interessado os pensadores de estratégia (como John Kay, por exemplo) ou os teóricos.

A idéia é que uma empresa já instalada num determinado setor já efetuou os gastos de "entrada", o que dificultaria que novos concorrentes. Em situações de competição, a empresa instalada poderia reduzir seus preços para um determinado nível, abaixo do seu custo mas acima do gasto com custos variáveis.

Isto é mais comum nos setores com excesso de capacidade instalada, onde as empresas usam a capacidade para influenciar seus concorrentes.

Uma análise do efeito do sunk cost como barreira de entrada está no recente paper de Cabral e Ross (clique aqui)